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Abstract—Radio Frequency (RF) fingerprinting aims to de-
velop a unique identity for a wireless device that can be used
in the same way a biological fingerprint operates, to improve
the security and privacy of wireless communication. This is in
contrast to the traditional bit-level algorithmic approaches to
securing transmissions. In this letter, we introduce RF finger-
printing, and a comprehensive overview of research challenges
and opportunities associated with its deployment in low-cost
portable mobile devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security is a new paradigm for securing the
identity of wireless devices by extracting the unique features
embedded in the electromagnetic waves emitted by transmit-
ters, called RF fingerprinting. RF fingerprinting broadly refers
to the process of identifying the source of a transmission based
on features extracted from its RF signal. The features of a
signal can be classified as:
a) Features specific to the channel, which describe the
response of the wireless channel and its surrounding
environment.
b) Features specific to the transmitter, which character-
ize the wireless transmitter through the unique radio-
metric features caused by the transmitter hardware.
RF fingerprinting based on features specific to a transmitter
is also called radiometric identification [1]. Radiometric iden-
tification uses only features originating from the transmitter
hardware and totally ignores features of the channel, such
as channel response. However, the transmitted signal passes
through a wireless channel, which might change some of its
attributes. In this letter, RF fingerprinting refers to the process
of identifying a specific transmitter from its received signal,
and no differentiation is made between features specific to the
channel and features specific to the transmitter.
Figure 1 is a generic rudimentary block diagram of a digital
radio communications system, which shows the transformation
of a baseband signal from its origin at the transmitter to its
reception at the receiver. The grey-shaded components are
typical sources of transmitter fingerprints. The imperfections
include modulation errors at the modulator, phase noise at
oscillators, spurious tones from mixers and Power Amplifiers
(PA), non-linearity distortion at PAs, power ramp distortions
(which are associated with the transients), and distortion of
the equivalent filter in the path from the digital module to
the antenna (including the analog Intermediate Frequency
(IF) filters and RF filters). Although it may be possible to
eliminate these hardware imperfections through more precise
Figure 1. Radiometric block diagram showing different sources of impair-
ments in overall digital communication system
manufacturing and quality control, this would greatly increase
the cost. In fact, most common technology standards, including
IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.22 , explicitly
require various wireless devices to tolerate rather wide ranges
of RF variations in received signals, in order to achieve
seamless operation. Therefore, these transmitter-specific RF
imperfections are likely to remain available for establishing
the identity of a transmitter.
The system-level diagram in Figure 1 displays the symmetry
of the digital radio transmitter and receiver. To a degree, the
receiver can be considered a reverse implementation of the
transmitter. The front ends of commodity wireless receivers are
built with inexpensive analog components, which have their
own imperfections and, together with channel impairments,
make it difficult to extract the unique features from the re-
ceived signals. Furthermore, these imperfections vary between
different receivers. Hence, despite the wealth of previous
work, there is a demand for the practical deployment of RF
fingerprinting using today’s typical low-end receivers rather
than performing experiments using high-end receivers in a
laboratory environment.
A typical receiver consists of an analog front-end and a dig-
ital signal processing block . The analog front-end is generally
non-ideal, which includes components such as a Low Noise
Amplifier (LNA), an Oscillator, a Mixer, filters, capacitors,
inductors and Analog to Digital Convertors. Additionally, the
front-end is built on a Printed Circuit Board (PCB), where
the components are mounted and connected via tracks [2].
Therefore, the design of the PCB and variations in its different
parameters (e.g tracks width, layers, component placement)
can introduce interference and distort the signal.
Distortion in most analog and RF circuit blocks arises either
due to inherent randomness during the manufacturing phase
[3, 4] or due to component non-linearities. Non-linearities
cause unwanted effects including spectral regrowth and spread-
ing, inter-symbol interference, and constellation warping [5].
The nonlinear properties change due to variation in tempera-
ture or device aging. For example, nonlinear phenomena that
are often associated with LNA are the gain compression (or
expansion) and the third order intermodulation product [6].
Mixers have non-ideal properties including self-mixing and in-
phase/quadrature-phase (I/Q) imbalance. The nonlinear char-
acteristics associated with oscillators include frequency offset
and phase jitter. It is possible to compensate for frequency
offset because it is slowly changing. The phase jitters have a
strong effect in cases where the symbols are rather long, for
example in OFDM systems.
Although many researchers have explored RF fingerprinting
techniques, the feasibility of RF fingerprinting using today’s
typical portable mobile devices has not yet been successful.
Researchers have not considered the limitations of the normal
receiver which is built with low-cost components and has
hardware imperfections embedded during the manufacturing
phase. Our research work on a small number of devices has
found that RF fingerprinting can be achieved with low-cost
receivers for a specific transmitter-receiver pair, and that it is
hard to reproduce an RF fingerprint from any other device that
will deceive the RF fingerprinting system [7]. The dependency
of RF fingerprinting on different parameters such as change
in device temperature, components aging and wireless channel
impairments are open research questions, which need to be
addressed.
A. Open Research Challenges
Modeling the impairments of transceivers: Majority of the
previous research into RF fingerprinting has experimentally
evaluated the effect of impairments present in the front end
of low-end devices. Our results reported in [7, 8] are based
on the experimental testbed that consists of seven low-end
transceivers, which were made of similar components. Per-
forming experiments with a large number of receivers and
transmitters would further validate our results. However, it
is quite difficult to perform experiments on a large test bed
owing to the cost of the equipment and the experimental
time involved. Therefore, a novel theoretical framework is
required, which should model the imperfections arising due to
the modulator, oscillators, mixers and Power Amplifiers (PA),
power ramp distortions, and distortion of the equivalent filter
in the path from the digital module to the antenna and from
various analog components in the transmission and reception
chains. Developing a theoretical model of a transceiver, which
could model the random impairments of different components
at front end would be a major contribution. The theoretical
model will enable the researchers to investigate the likelihood
of two receivers forming the same fingerprint of a single
transmitter in order to analyze the reliability and robustness
of RF.
Effect of mobility and device aging: Majority of the RF
fingerprinting experiments have deployed the transmitter and
receiver at a fixed location during the measurements. There-
fore, variations in channel characteristics were limited. Our
preliminary simulation results show that channel impairments
have limited effect on the performance of RF fingerprint-
ing [9]. Measurements should be performed for a moveable
transmitter and receiver, and data captured over many days
to further investigate the effect of channel impairments. This
would give an insight into any variation that can occur in an
RF fingerprint over time.
Device aging would deteriorate the parameters of differ-
ent RF components in front-end of transmitter and receiver.
Furthermore variation in the temperature of the device and
environment will also have some effects on an RF fingerprint.
This would change the RF fingerprint of the transmitter over
the time. To the best knowledge of the authors, there is no
research article available to support this argument. Therefore,
the effect of device aging and temperature variations is an
open research issue and requires further investigation.
To compensate for changes in the RF fingerprint that could
arise over time as transmitters’ age, an unsupervised fast, reli-
able, and computationally less expensive incremental machine-
learning algorithm should be developed. The unsupervised
machine-learning algorithm should enable a wireless device
to autonomously create an RF fingerprint and provide secrecy
and privacy of the wireless device.
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